INTRODUCTION:
Outbreak preparedness and response in sub-Saharan Africa increasingly emphasise locally led and contextually grounded approaches. However, local social scientists remain inconsistently integrated into outbreak systems. Without their sufficient representation and input, preparedness and response strategies risk being poorly targeted and overly biomedical, delaying uptake of life-saving interventions. This study examined how local social scientists experience inclusion and marginalisation and identified actionable changes to strengthen their roles and improve outbreak operations.

METHODS:
We conducted a multi-country qualitative study using semi-structured interviews with local social scientists involved in infectious disease preparedness and response across sub-Saharan Africa. This analysis draws on 28 interviews with social scientists embedded within Ministries of Health and national public health institutions and risk communication and community engagement teams across East, Southern and West Africa. Interviews were conducted in English with a median duration of 70 minutes.

RESULTS:
Participants described social science as essential but structurally under-resourced. The most consistent barrier was funding architecture: social scientists were rarely budgeted as first deployers, which often leads to delayed field assessments and evidence arriving after interventions had begun. A second barrier concerned organisational hierarchy, with social science positioned under risk communication rather than as an independent pillar, limiting authority and access to decision-making. Respondents also reported biomedical dominance within incident management systems, where qualitative evidence was devalued or overridden by command-and-control approaches, sometimes generating distrust and evasion. Where social science inputs were sufficiently used, they improved operations such as by adapting Ebola engagement and reshaping cholera messaging and care-seeking pathways.

CONCLUSIONS:
Local social scientists represent core outbreak capacity rather than an optional add-on. Our findings support three actions: ring-fencing rapid social science funding; formalising social science roles within incident management systems; and institutionalising preparedness through standing rosters, training and social listening frameworks linked to decision pathways, accountability and mechanisms.